This contribution considers whether a manufacturer of luxury goods, who operates a selective distribution system, may lawfully ban its appointed dealers from selling the contract goods via third-part online platforms under the EU competition rules. On the basis of an analysis of the relevant legal provisions and the existing case law, it is suggested that, while the aim of Restrictions on the use of third-party platforms in selective distribution agreements for luxury goods Anne C. Witt * E-commerce is currently attracting a great deal of attention from antitrust circles.
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Fabre, the manufacturer had imposed an absolute prohibition on online sales on his appointed distributors. The second question that has occupied and divided the national enforcement bodies ever since this ruling is therefore whether 'merely' prohibiting distributors from selling goods on a third-party platforms, while permitting the sale on the distributor's own website, should also be considered a hardcore restriction within the meaning of the current Block Exemption Regulation for Vertical Agreements. 8 The aim of this contribution is to examine how restrictions on the use of thirdpart platforms in the context of selective distribution systems for luxury goods should be assessed under Article 101(1) TFEU and the current Block Exemption Regulation for Vertical Agreements. In particular, it aims to address whether the objective of protecting the image of a luxury good should, in principle at least, be capable of justifying the use of selective distribution. The second issue it examines is whether prohibiting distributors from selling luxury goods on third-party platforms should be To this end, the following analysis begins by briefly explaining the concept of a selective distribution system within the meaning of EU competition law, identifying the relevant legal provisions, and critically reviewing how the Court of Justice has applied these rules to selective distribution systems in the past. It further takes into account the diverging positions of several national competition agencies, national courts and the European Commission. On this basis, this contribution finally analyses the relevant legal issues and proposes an answer to the questions raised above.
The concept of a selective distribution system
Selective distribution systems, within the meaning of EU competition law, are arrangements in which the supplier choses to sell the contract good only to distributors who meet certain criteria, usually relating to their personal qualifications or their sales premises, and in which these distributors undertake not to sell on such goods to 8 9 Selective distribution has always been common practice for manufacturers of branded goods ion Europe, and the preliminary findings of the Commission's on-going E-commerce Sector Inquiry suggest that the advent of online distribution has only increased this trend. When asked to identify what measures they had taken in reaction to the growth of e-commerce over the last 10 years, 19% of manufacturers reported having introduced a selective distribution system where they had not applied selective distribution beforehand. 67% of manufacturers reported that they had introduced new criteria in their distribution agreements. All in all, over half of the manufacturers who responded to the Commission's questionnaire replied that they nowadays made use of selective distribution for at least some of their products. 10 When asked to identify their reasons for using selective distribution, manufacturers commonly stated that their purpose was to ensure high quality distribution, to influence the quality of pre-and after-sales services, to enhance the overall shopping experience of customers and to protect brand image. In particular with regard to the last aim, manufacturers specified that they used selective distribution to preserve consumer's prestige and luxury perceptions, as well as the reputation of their brand, by seeking to ensure an adequate sales environment.
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Producers of luxury goods have traditionally been particularly selective about the types of retailers whom they trust with selling their goods, and have commonly made admission to the distribution network dependent on the retail outlet meeting certain quality expectations on factors such as shop location, facade, name, decoration, fittings and the availability of other luxury brands, as well as the qualifications of sales staff. 12 In the age of online retail, they have become keen to extend this control to their distributors' virtual distribution channels as well. They therefore often impose restrictions on online sales and set criteria for admission to their networks that de facto Final peer reviewed manuscript accepted in European Competition Journal, 2017. 5 approach to distribution under the EU competition rules. 13 As a first step, the following therefore explores the relevant legal rules and their interpretation in the case law. Final peer reviewed manuscript accepted in European Competition Journal, 2017.
The relevant legal instruments and their interpretation in the case law
competition was so important that it could never be eliminated, it did not constitute the only effective form of competition or one to which absolute priority had to be accorded in every case. The exemption provision of Article 101(3) TFEU showed that the aim of maintaining workable competition could be reconciled with other legitimate objectives.
Certain restrictions on competition were therefore permissible, provided that they were essential for attaining those other objectives and did not eliminate competition entirely.
Maintaining a certain price level for specialist retailers and wholesalers that ensured the continued existence of this channel of distribution in the interest of consumers was such a legitimate objective. 23 On the basis of these considerations, the Court ruled that selective distribution agreements constituted an aspect of competition that was many others. Consequently, the General Court regularly had the opportunity to review the application of this case law and further develop its principles. Of these judgments, one is of particular importance for the issues under discussion in this contribution, and shall be briefly discussed in the following.
Groupement d'achat Edouard Leclerc
In the two Metro cases, the Court of Justice had been willing to condone the restriction of competition inherent in selective distribution systems for 'high quality and technically advanced consumer durables' 41 on the grounds that such products required expert technical pre-sales advice. 42 In 1980, it indicated that the Metro formula could also apply to newspapers because of their extremely short shelf lives, which necessitated choosing distributors particularly carefully.
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In the mid-1990s, the General Court further extended this case law to luxury goods.
In two separate proceedings, the Groupement d'achat Edouard Leclerc ('Galec'), failed to gain access to these networks, as the supermarkets it supplied did not meet the selection criteria. The Commission assessed these distribution systems under the Metro test, and found that a number of the contractual obligations passed the test, whereas the remainder could be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU because they were necessary to preserve the luxury image of the brands in question.
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The General Court confirmed the Commission's analysis on most points. In particular, it held that while the Metro test was originally developed for high-quality and technically advanced consumer durables, other types of products could also require selective distribution. It considered that this was the case of luxury cosmetics and perfumes. In addition to being the result of meticulous research and using materials of high quality, these products enjoyed a 'luxury image' in the eyes of consumers, which distinguished them from similar products. Accordingly, the characteristics of luxury cosmetics could not be limited to their material characteristics but also encompassed the specific perception that consumers had of them. 47 It was in the interests of consumers seeking to purchase luxury cosmetics that their 'aura of luxury' was not tarnished, as they would otherwise no longer be regarded as luxury products. Generalised distribution of such products, as a result of which the manufacturer would have no opportunity of ensuring that they were sold in appropriate conditions, would entail the risk of deterioration in product presentation, which could harm the luxury image and thus the very character of the products. 48 Criteria that sought to ensure that such goods were presented in an a manner that preserved their luxury image therefore pursued an objective which improved competition by preserving the luxury image in the interests of consumers, and thus counterbalanced the restriction of competition inherent in the selective distribution system. The General Court therefore concluded that such criteria constituted a legitimate requirement for the purposes of the case law established in It first pointed out that, under the Treaty's free movement rules, the Court did not accept arguments relating to the need to provide individual advice to the customer and to ensure their protection against the incorrect use of products in the context of nonprescription medicines and contact lenses as justifying a ban on Internet sales. 58 It then briefly turned to Pierre Fabre's argument that it had employed this particular type of distribution system in order to maintain the prestigious image of Pierre Fabre products.
In one sentence, and without any further rationalisation, the Court ruled that the aim of maintaining a prestigious image was not a legitimate aim for restricting competition and could therefore not justify a finding that a contractual clause pursuing such an aim did not fall within Article 101(1) TFEU. 59 On this basis, the Paris Court of Appeal later upheld the French Competition Authority's prohibition decision. Final
Even more puzzling is the unequivocal statement in Pierre Fabre that the aim of maintaining a prestigious image is not a legitimate purpose for restricting competition.
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The Court does not provide any reasoning for this conclusion. Neither does it explain how it is compatible with its ruling in Edouard Leclerc, in which the General Court had explicitly held that the 'luxury image' and 'aura of exclusivity' were part of the main characteristics of luxury products. Not only had the General Court considered this image worth protecting in the interest of consumers. It had deemed it capable of justifying selective distribution, because generalised distribution of such products would risk harming the 'luxury image' and thus the very character of the products. 63 
The Block Exemption Regulation on Vertical Restraints
The legal provision It is the list of hardcore restrictions that has caused enforcers the greatest headache in the context of selective distribution agreements to date, and amongst these, Article 4(b)(iii) and (c) are of particular relevance for the issues under consideration.
Article (b)(iii) defines as a hardcore restriction: the restriction of the territory into which, or of the customers to whom, a buyer party to the agreement, without prejudice to a restriction on its place of establishment, may sell the contract goods or services, except: (…) the restriction of sales by the m em bers of a selective distribution system to unauthorised distributors within the territory reserved by the supplier to operate that system. In other words, combining a selective distribution system with an exclusive territory or customer allocation makes the agreement fall outside the scope of the block exemption. However, the manufacturer may prohibit the distributors from selling the contract good to third parties who are not part of the selective distribution network. The guidelines are based on the premise that, in principle, every distributor, including members of a selective distribution network, should be allowed to use the Internet to sell products. 82 However, they also make clear that the Commission considers certain restrictions on the use of the Internet compatible with the Block Exemption Regulation. In particular, the Commission considers it appropriate for the supplier to require quality standards for the use of the Internet site to resell his goods, just as he may require quality standards for a retail outlet, 83 as long as they are overall equivalent to the criteria imposed for the sales from the brick and mortar shop 84 The guidelines further state that the Commission considers it acceptable for the manufacturer to require that its distributors use third party platforms to distribute the contract products only in accordance with the standards and conditions agreed between the supplier and its distributors for the distributors' use of the Internet. In particular,
where the distributor's website is hosted by a third-party platform, the supplier may require that customers not visit the distributor's website through a site carrying the name or logo of the third-party platform. 85 In other words, the guidelines do not consider it a hardcore restriction within the meaning of Article 4(b) or (c) to prohibit the distributor from marketing goods on a third-party online platform that carries the name or logo of that third party. It has been argued in the literature that this interpretation of the Block Exemption Regulation is not compatible with the Court's interpretation of the Regulation 330/2010's predecessor in Pierre Fabre, and that the guidelines must be considered 'overruled' on this point.
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This was also the position, for example, of the German first instance court in Coty Germany, 87 and it appears that the German competition authority takes the same view.
Analysis

The interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU
Given that the Court continues to adhere to the Metro test 89 for assessing the competitive impact of selective distribution agreements under Article 101(1) TFEU, the first question that needs to be addressed is whether preserving the 'luxury image' of a luxury good should be considered a legitimate aim within the meaning of the Metro case law. It is suggested here that the Court should rethink or at least rephrase its dictum in Pierre Fabre according to which the aim of maintaining a prestigious image can never be a legitimate aim for restricting competition. 90 The Metro formula, reiterated in Pierre Fabre, is based on the premise that selective distribution can be compatible with Article 101(1) if the product in question necessitates such a network in order to preserve its quality or to ensure its proper use. 91 Or, to use the langue of Pierre Fabre, the manufacturer must be pursuing a legitimate goal capable of improving competition in relation to factors other than price by means of its selective distribution system.
In the case of most luxury products, selective distribution is unlikely to be used to ensure their proper use. Most users of luxury cosmetics or clothing know how to use them. Selective distribution may be considered necessary in order to combat free-riding, and to ensure that distributors invest resources in customer service, which could be considered beneficial for consumers because it ensures the availability of this type of 'high frills' distribution channel, and could also be seen as enhancing interbrand competition. However, this is a separate issue. The problem under consideration here is whether preserving the 'luxury image' of a good should in principle be considered a legitimate purpose for using a selective distribution system.
There are good reasons to answer this question in the affirmative. The commercial value of a luxury good is not only determined by the material quality of its components or the craftsmanship that has gone into making it. There is also a psychological component to its value. Consumers value items belonging to successful luxury brands partially or even primarily because of the image associated with this 89 brand. A handbag made by a luxury brand is not necessarily better made, or of higher quality materials, than that of a less prestigious brand. Nonetheless, certain consumers are willing to pay a higher price for the luxury item because of the brand image.
Understanding why certain consumers value luxury and what makes them consider something a luxury good in the first place is the subject of research across many disciplines. Whatever the exact psychological mechanism may be, there is widespread agreement amongst economists, psychologists and marketing experts that the image and perception of exclusivity in the eyes of consumers is a key characteristic and component of the good.
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The Court of Justice of the European Union itself recognised this phenomenon in a number of judgements. For example, this was the position of the General Court in the case of Edouard Leclerc discussed above, where it held that the characteristic of a luxury good could not be limited to its material characteristics, but that it also encompassed the specific perception that consumers had of it, in particular its 'aura of luxury'. 93 While it has been suggested that the Court of Justice overruled this principle in Pierre Fabre, 94 it is curious that it should have done so without even mentioning the ruling in Edouard Leclerc. Moreover, in the area of EU trademark law, the Court has repeatedly held that the quality of luxury goods is not just the result of their material characteristics, but also of their "allure and prestigious image" in the eyes of consumers, which bestows upon them an aura of luxury. In Copad v Christian Dior, for example, the Court therefore concluded that an impairment to that aura of luxury was likely to affect the actual quality of those goods. On that basis, it held that the proprietor of a trade mark could invoke the rights conferred by that trade mark against a licensee who contravened a provision in a licence agreement prohibiting, on grounds of the trade mark's prestige, sales to discount stores, provided that it had been established that that contravention damaged the allure and prestigious image which bestowed on those goods an aura of luxury.
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If one thus accepts that, in the case of luxury goods at least, the image of exclusivity is an integral part of the good, one also has to accept that if the image is tarnished, the good loses in value. This is not only detrimental to the producer, but also to those consumers who appreciate such goods. Therefore, the protection of a luxury image should, in principle, be considered a legitimate goal for operating selective distribution networks under Article 101(1) TFEU. Any other position would result in reducing consumer welfare by depriving consumers of a type of product they value, even if this appreciation may be considered irrational or even morally questionable by others. However, these other consumers need not purchase such goods. As long as there is sufficient inter-brand competition and a sufficient number of alternatives in the form of non-branded products, or products of a less prestigious brand that compete primarily on the basis of material quality and price, the welfare of those consumers who do not value luxury goods is not affected. Ultimately, not allowing manufacturers of luxury goods to protect the exclusive image of their products at all by means of vertical restraints is likely to make them stop using independent retailers and revert entirely to vertically integrated sales outlets, which is not in the interest of competition or consumers.
This does not mean, of course, that competitive restraints imposed by a manufacturer to protect the luxury image of his goods are off limits for competition authorities. The Metro test imposes several further conditions in addition to the legitimate aim. In particular, it requires that the restraints be necessary to achieve the legitimate aim. This raises the question whether a ban on the use of third-party platforms is really necessary to protect the aura of exclusivity of a luxury good.
Producers of luxury goods commonly argue in judicial proceedings that marketing luxury goods on general auction platforms such as ebay, for example, which has been likened to the virtual equivalent of a real world flea market, has a negative effect on these products' image of exclusivity. 96 This does not seem implausible, and the same may be true for virtual market places such as amazon. It is the manufacturer who bears the burden of proving such an effect in the individual case. However, it seems that a blanket ban on the use of third-party platforms, at least, would go beyond what is necessary to protect these good's image. There are third-party platforms that specialise in the distribution of luxury goods. Should they meet the criteria required by the manufacturer for the authorised distributor's own online shop, it is not immediately obvious why the image of goods should suffer more on such a platform than from the sale through the distributor's online site. A less restrictive restraint than a blanket ban would therefore be to make the distribution via third-party platforms conditional on the manufacturer approving the third-party platform on the basis of the same objective, qualitative and proportionate criteria it requires from the distributor's online shop.
Assessing whether the qualitative criteria imposed on distributors and third-party platforms are necessary is not straightforward, and different enforcement bodies are bound to reach different conclusions. This, however, is a general weakness of the Metro formula and its proportionality test, rather than a problem that is specific to the marketing of luxury items.
Incidentally, a case could be made that the legitimacy of protecting a brand name and image should not be limited to luxury brands only, but be extended to any brand. The Court's case law on franchising is based on the very premise that the franchisor has a legitimate interest in protecting his brand, and therefore considers that Coty Germany 106 will do exactly this.
